As neighbours and partners, Europe and Africa cooperate closely on a vast range of important issues. In the area of peace and security, the African Peace Facility (APF) has contributed significantly to enhanced dialogue and cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) since its creation in 2003. Peace and security is one of the priority areas identified under the Africa – EU partnership which was established in Lisbon in 2007. It was reconfirmed as a priority at the 4th Africa-EU Summit in Brussels in April 2014.

The APF is an instrument financed under the European Development Fund (EDF). In 2016, as in previous years, the largest share of APF funds was allocated to African-led Peace Support Operations. The APF also offers long-term financial support for the full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It provides our African partners with an accessible and quick source of funding for the early prevention, management and resolution of crises (the Early Response Mechanism).

The area of peace and security will remain high on the agenda. It is one of the priorities of the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council for a "renewed impetus of the Africa-EU partnership" as well as one of the cornerstones of the European Union’s proposal for a renewed partnership with countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, when the current Cotonou Partnership Agreement expires in February 2020.

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1 See section 6, page 32 for a full list of acronyms.
Based on the recognition that peace is a necessary precondition for sustainable development, the European Union (EU) established the African Peace Facility (APF) in December 2003 in response to an African request to support peace and security.

The current overall objective of the APF is to contribute to promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development. This supports Sustainable Development Goal 16 (on peace, justice and strong institutions) and the African Union’s Agenda 2063 commitment “to silence the guns by 2020” and therefore reduce the number of violent conflicts on the continent.

The current specific objective of the APF is to effectively support the African Union Commission (AUC) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) in implementing the African Peace and Security Agenda and to address conflicts on the continent in a comprehensive manner.

Over the years, the APF has become one of the main instruments supporting Africa-EU cooperation on peace and security. More than EUR 2.1 billion has been allocated to the APF since it was created. EUR 1.9 billion has been contracted and almost EUR 1.8 billion was paid through this instrument by the end of 2016.

This support enables the African Union (AU) and the RECs/RMs to strengthen their respective roles in peace and security, take responsibility for the stability of the continent, and emerge as internationally recognised actors in the political and security arenas. The strategic approach of the APF is based on a combination of immediate short-term funding in the event of crises and longer-term support for institutional capacity-building in peace and security.

In 2016, the APF continued to support the AU and the RECs/RMs having a mandate in peace and security. The activities funded fall into three categories:

1. **African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs);**

In 2016 the most active PSOs were in Somalia, Guinea Bissau, South Sudan, the Lake Chad Basin, and Central Africa. The largest part of the APF’s financing continued to be directed to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

2. **Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA);**

Support for capacity-building continued through the third phase of the APSA Support Programme, which will contribute to the implementation of the 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap, which was jointly adopted by the AU and the RECs/RMs at the end of 2015.

To ensure proper implementation of the APSA, the AUC Salaries Programme in Peace and Security enabled the African Union to sustain its personnel costs. The AU Liaison Offices Programme enabled it to maintain its network of liaison offices deployed in conflict and post-conflict countries in Africa.

The APF also continued to offer the framework for the EU’s financial and political support to the AMANI AFRICA
II training and exercise cycle for the operational readiness of the African Standby Force (ASF). In this context, the EU has also continued to support the AU in the acquisition of a Command, Control, Communication and Information System (C3IS).

3. Initiatives under the Early Response Mechanism (ERM).

The ERM component of the APF continued to support the AU and the RECs in preventing crises across Africa. In total, the APF continued to fund five initiatives in the field of mediation, shuttle diplomacy or human rights monitoring in South Sudan, Libya and Burundi among others.

The European Commission has increased its control over the implementation and financial management of APF activities by partner implementing organisations (i.e. the AUC and the RECs/RMs) to respond to concerns regarding transparency, accountability and reporting requirements. One of the major challenges faced by the APSA institutions is to strengthen the institutional capacities in line with their political ambitions. To address this issue, the European Commission and the AUC signed an Aide Memoire in April 2016 which outlines measures to strengthen the AUC’s financial management capacities. Such measures also apply to the RECs/RMs whose audits revealed critical financial findings. Two monitoring mechanisms have also been set up, one at the political level that meets on a yearly basis, and the other one that meets quarterly at the technical level.

From the EU legislative side, the Council adopted a Decision\(^4\) to allow the replenishing of the APF with funds decommitted under the 10th EDF for up to EUR 491 million. The Commission adopted two Decisions amending the 2014-2016 APF action programme to allow for a simplification of the payment modalities to troop contributing countries to African-led PSOs, for an increase of EUR 150 million\(^5\). The Council also endorsed the new EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Partner Countries\(^6\).

Objective of the Annual Report

This Annual Report contributes to the fulfilment of the European Commission’s legal commitment “to prepare an activity report on the use of the (APF) funds for the information of the Council and the EDF Committee on an annual basis.”

The report starts with a general overview of the APF instrument, including its origin and initiation, policy context, priorities, legal basis, evolution and current challenges. The next section provides an update on the three main areas of action from January-December 2016. Lastly, a new chapter on the management of the APF is presented. The annex to the report contains updated facts and figures on the budget and its initiatives.

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7 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund (Article 15(1)), under the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (Cotonou Agreement).
2. The African Peace Facility: overview

Its origins: the African Union (AU) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The AU was established in 2002 with a broad political mandate in the area of peace-building and conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. Together with the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the AU established the APSA as a structural and long-term response to African peace and security challenges.

The APSA is made up of several components and structures:

- The AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC)\(^8\), which is the central decision-making body;
- Eight RECs with a mandate in peace and security, which form the pillars of the overall security architecture:
  - Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
  - Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
  - Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
  - East African Community (EAC)
  - Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
  - Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
  - Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
  - Southern African Development Community (SADC);
- Two Regional Mechanisms (RMs):
  - Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM)
  - North African Regional Capability (NARC);
- The Panel of the Wise (POW) with a mandate in conflict prevention and resolution;
- The African Standby Force (ASF);
- The African Peace Fund \(^9\) with a mandate to promote the work of the AU Commission’s (AUC) Peace and Security Department (AU PSD); and
- The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) with the role of supporting AU PSC decision-making and guiding deployment of the ASF.

The links between the AUC and the RECs/RMs were formalised through the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding in 2008.

The policy context

The APF was created to strengthen the financial capacity of the African institutions to foster peace and security on the continent in response to a request made by the AU Summit in Maputo in July 2003\(^10\).

The overall objective of the APF, created after the AU Summit in Maputo in 2003, is to support peace, stability and security in Africa and provide the basis for sustainable development, based on the principle of African ownership.

Peace and security is one of the main pillars of the EU’s 2005 Strategy for Africa\(^11\). In order to further enhancing its support in this area, the EU put forward a concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in 2006\(^12\).

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\(^9\) Article 21 of the same Protocol.


\(^12\) Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Capabilities_Africa_20.11.pdf>.
The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), adopted in Lisbon in 2007, defined peace and security as one of the eight areas of partnership (the Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership). The aim of the partnership is to support “African solutions for African problems” and one of its key areas of cooperation is the operationalisation of the APSA. The JAES and its successive Action Plans were renewed at the third Africa-EU Summit in Tripoli in 2010.

The fourth Africa-EU Summit in Brussels in April 2014 confirmed and sustained support for APSA through the APF. It also adopted the Roadmap 2014-2017, which refocuses the implementation of the Joint Strategy on five priority areas: peace and security; democracy, good governance and human rights; human development; sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration; and global and emerging issues.

In November 2017, the fifth Africa-EU Summit will take place in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. All African and European leaders will meet to renew their commitments within the framework of the JAES and set new ambitions for the years to come. In the lead up to the Summit, the EU has adopted a joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council on a “Renewed impetus of the Africa-EU Partnership”, which is scheduled for adoption on the 3rd of May.

The APF is a pan-African instrument in nature. Financial support must be requested by and provided to the AU and/or the RECs. Undertakings at the national level are not eligible for funding.

Since its creation, the APF has evolved into the main tool for implementing the Africa-EU Peace and Security Cooperation in complementarity with:

- the Regional and National programmes under the EDF;
- the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP);
- the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa;
- actions under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and
- military and civilian missions and operations under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The 3 components of the APF are:

- African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs);
- operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA);
- initiatives under the Early Response Mechanism (ERM).

The Cotonou Agreement between the EU and seventy-nine countries from the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) provides the overall legal framework for the APF.

The APF was established based on the recognition that peace and security are necessary preconditions for sustainable development and vice versa. This was underlined in an agreement by EU Member States in November 2007.
2007\textsuperscript{20}, which specified that the nexus between development and security should inform EU strategies and policies.

The second revision of the Cotonou Agreement in 2010 also recognised the interdependence between security and development stating that “without development and poverty reduction there will be no sustainable peace and security, and that without peace and security there can be no sustainable development”\textsuperscript{21}.

\section*{Financing of the APF}

When the APF was established in 2003\textsuperscript{22}, the EU treaties strictly precluded any financing under the EU budget of operational expenditure having ‘military or defence implications.’ However the European Development Fund (EDF), which is the main instrument for funding the Cotonou Agreement, is not part of the EU budget and is subject to different rules. The APF has been funded by the ‘intra-ACP’ envelopes of the 9\textsuperscript{th}, 10\textsuperscript{th} and now 11\textsuperscript{th} EDFs. The debate on the inclusion of the EDF in the EU budget post 2020 could therefore have implications on the future of the APF.

In line with the current EDF regulations\textsuperscript{23}, APF funds can be used to finance costs incurred by African peace-keeping forces under the banner of the AU or a REC/RM. These funds cover, for instance, the cost of transporting troops, soldiers’ living expenses, and the development of capabilities. The list of non-eligible APF expenditure includes ammunition, arms and specific military equipment, spare parts for arms and military equipment, salaries and military training for soldiers.

Occasionally, other sources have been used, for example de-commitments from previous (‘closed’) EDFs, regional EDF envelopes, additional voluntary contributions from EU Member States to the EDF and in one case the EU budget for expenses eligible under the APF\textsuperscript{24}.

Important work has taken place over the year to strengthen coherence among peace and security activities in Africa under the CSDP and those funded by other EU instruments. With important APF funding made available for the operationalisation of APSA and increasing demands on the PSOs, strengthening of coherence and complementarity with other funding sources becomes increasingly important. Support should be delivered through a comprehensive framework mirroring AU and RECs/RMs strategic objectives and priorities, and the APF should focus on remaining a truly pan-African instrument.

\section*{The decision-making procedure}

Each intervention to be financed by the APF has to be specifically requested by the AU or by a REC/RM which is part of the APSA. If a request comes from a REC/RM, it must be submitted and endorsed by the AU.

The European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission present a joint information note on the intervention requested, with recommendations.

\textsuperscript{21} See in particular Article 1 (on “Objectives of the partnership”), Article 8(5) (on “Political dialogue”), Article 11 (on “Peace building policies, conflict prevention and resolution, response to situations of fragility”), Articles 28(2)(a) and 29(1) (on “Regional Cooperation and Integration”): http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209565%20202010%20INT.
\textsuperscript{22} Council decision N° 3/2003 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 on the use of resources from the long-term development envelope of the 9\textsuperscript{th} EDF for the creation of the Peace facility for Africa.
\textsuperscript{23} See footnote 3 + Council Regulation (EU) 2015/323 of 2 March 2015 on the financial regulation applicable to the 11\textsuperscript{th} EDF.
\textsuperscript{24} EUR 7.5 million contribution from the South Africa Heading to supplement the 9\textsuperscript{th} EDF envelope.
to the relevant Council preparatory working groups. The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) then decides on the political appropriateness of the intervention requested.

For support to new peace operations, once the request has been endorsed by the PSC, the Commission must adopt a formal decision on the envisaged intervention. No Commission decision is needed for the extension or renewal of support to an existing peace operation, or for support to operationalise the APSA.

An accelerated procedure exists for APF interventions requiring an urgent response under the ERM, which aims to respond to requests within 10 days.

**Beneficiaries and partners**

The direct beneficiaries of the APF are the AU and the RECs/RMs with a mandate in peace and security, and the relevant institutions and structures within or related to the APSA. The final beneficiaries are the people of Africa who will be less affected by conflicts and who will live in a safer environment.

The EU is not the only actor providing assistance to the AU and the RECs in the area of peace and security. A wide range of other donors such as international organisations like the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and individual countries like the United States, China, and some EU Member States are active in this field as well. Particularly for PSOs (e.g. AMISOM), considerable support is provided by the UN, other international organisations, EU Member States and non-EU countries. An AU partners’ group on peace and security meets on a regular basis in Addis Ababa to ensure that support is complementary.

**Evolution and current challenges**

Since its creation in December 2003, the APF has evolved in two ways; its scope has broadened and it has become part of a wider EU strategy for peace and security in Africa.

In financial terms, more than EUR 2.1 billion has been allocated to the APF since it was created. EUR 1.9 billion has been contracted and EUR 1.8 billion has been paid over the period from 2004 to 2016.

- Under the 9th EDF, EUR 348 million was committed in total. Additional voluntary contributions amounting to nearly EUR 40 million were made by Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, and Luxembourg.
- Under the 10th EDF, over EUR 751 million was committed. Belgium made a voluntary contribution of EUR 0.6 million to the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (MICOPAX).
- Under the 11th EDF, the first Action Programme 2014-2016 was adopted by the Commission in July 2014 with an initial contribution of EUR 750 million. Due to increasing needs an additional EUR 150 million was allocated in December 2015 and an additional EUR 150 million in December 2016.

An additional voluntary contribution of EUR 1.24 million was made by Denmark for AMISOM, taking the total amount committed for 2014-2016 to EUR 1051.2 million.

The 2017-2018 Action Programme is currently being prepared, with a planned allocation of EUR 535 million from the 11th EDF.

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2. THE AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY: OVERVIEW

Over the period 2004-2016, annual contracts have averaged EUR 151 million and annual payments have averaged EUR 139 million. There is an upward trend for both contracts and payments, especially since 2010.

Amounts for the 11th EDF are referring to the 2014-2016 period.

Figure 1 – APF financial overview under EDF9, EDF10 and EDF11 (in million EUR)

Figure 2 – Evolution of contracted amounts and payments, 2010-2016 (in million EUR)
The bulk of the APF envelope between 2004 and 2016 was allocated to PSOs (EUR 1,766 million or 89.5% of total contracts). EUR 164 million (8.31%) was used for capacity-building and EUR 30 million (1.52%) for the ERM (see Figure 3).

Figure 3 – Allocation of the APF envelope between 2004 and 2016 (in million EUR)

Together with an increasing number of crises, this evolution has led to a situation where the financing needs of the APF have increasingly mobilised development funds. This has triggered a particularly vivid debate over the financial sustainability of the APF over the last two years.

The principles adopted by the EU Political and Security Committee of the Council in July 2015, aimed at ensuring the financing of on-going Peace Support Operations in the short-term while increasing the predictability and financial sustainability of the APF in the longer-term, have led to a series of initiatives, including:

- launching joint demarches to AU Member States\(^26\) to explain the APF’s limitations, to underline the need to raise African funding for African-led PSOs, and to recall their collective commitment to gradually cover 25% of the AU peace and security budget by 2020\(^27\);
- launching demarches to other international partners, countries and organisations from other regions to attract further funding for African-led PSOs and capacity-building programmes\(^28\);
- enhancing EU dialogue with the UN on supporting sustainable African-led PSOs, including during the

\(^{26}\) In particular Troop Contributing Countries to African-led PSOs funded by the APF.

\(^{27}\) AU Summit in South Africa in June 2015, a decision reconfirmed by the 24th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union held in Addis Ababa (30-31 January 2015).

\(^{28}\) Australia, Brazil, China, India, Japan, Kuwait, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, League of Arab States and UN.
last UN-EU Steering Committee on Crisis Management;

- introducing a new ceiling in PSOs contracts for a maximum EU contribution of 80% for troop allowances and a similar ceiling for AMISOM as from January 2016;
- introducing in contracts specific provisions concerning an exit strategy;
- shifting support from troops costs to capacity-building; and
- supporting more ODA-eligible capacity-building and activities under the ERM, such as mediation and diplomacy.

From the EU legislative side, the Council adopted a Decision\(^\text{29}\) to allow the replenishing of the APF with funds decommitted under the 10\(^{th}\) EDF for up to EUR 491 million. The Commission adopted two Decisions amending the 2014-2016 APF action programme to reflect some of the principles adopted at the July 2015 PSC meeting, for an increase of EUR 150 million\(^\text{30}\). In a related field, the Council also endorsed the new EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Partner Countries\(^\text{31}\).

In January 2016, the AU mandated Dr Donal Kaberuka as its High Representative to develop a sustainable financial strategy for the pan-African Peace Fund. Dr Kaberuka proposed\(^\text{32}\) a 0.2% levy on all eligible African imports to fund the AU’s operating, programme, and peace and security operations budget.

This levy should allow the AU to meet the requirement to fund 25% of African-led peace support operations by 2020, with a contribution of USD 325m in 2017, rising to a total of USD 400m by 2020. It would finance mediation and preventive diplomacy, institutional capacity-building; and peace support operations. The remainder would fund the AU’s general budget.

The launch of the Peace Fund, which according to Kaberuka’s original timeline was foreseen during the January 2017 AU Summit in Addis Ababa, did not take place. However, technical preparations have reportedly been progressing steadily.

In parallel, a report by Paul Kagame\(^\text{33}\) addressing short-comings in the functioning of the AU, especially concerning better management, impact and financing, has recently been discussed amongst African Heads of State.

High level contacts also took place with AU interlocutors\(^\text{34}\) which suggest continuing the discussion over the next months, within the framework of the Africa-EU Summit in 2017 or other high level bilateral meetings between EU-AU Member States.

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\(^{29}\) Decision (EU) 2016/1337 OJ L212 of 05.08.2016, p. 107

- on the 2014-2016 Action Programme of the APF in favour of the AU.


\(^{32}\) Kaberuka, D. AU Peace Fund, Securing Predictable and sustainable financing for peace in Africa, 26 August 2016, which was adopted at the 27\(^{th}\) AU Summit in August 2016.


\(^{34}\) In particular during the EU-AU Commission to Commission (C2C) meeting in April 2016 and the Joint AU-EU Peace and Security Committee/Political and Security Committee (PSC to PSC) meeting in October 2016.
As well as the debate on financial sustainability, a broader discussion on Capacity-Building in support of Security and Development (CBSD) has been taking place on the basis of a Joint Communication. In this context, the Council invited the EEAS and the Commission services to continue work on the potential of all relevant EU instruments and to assess the feasibility of adapting the APF to address its limitations. Adapting the Instrument Contributing to Security and Peace (IcSP) has been judged as the best way to go in the short term. Discussions are currently ongoing at the Parliament.

ODA Eligibility of APF-funded initiatives in 2016

Continuing the new approach taken in 2015, a small part of the APF disbursements have been included in the EDF amounts reported by the EU as eligible to Official Development Aid (ODA) according to the Development Aid Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). A distinction has been made between those programmes that are very largely reportable and those programmes that have little activities which are reportable.

Following this approach, in 2016 all payments made to AMISOM and ECOMIB have been considered as non-eligible for ODA. All payments under the APSA, the Joint Framework Agreement (Salaries and Liaison Offices), technical assistance, the ERM and the IGAD-led MVM and its successor CTSAMM, have been considered as eligible for ODA.

In financial terms, EUR 25 million out of around EUR 217 million paid in 2016 has been reported (around 11.5% of total payments). This is an increase of 6.5% percentage points compared to 2015 (5%) and reflects the commitment to finance more capacity-building.

The OECD/DAC agreed in February 2016 to new rules allowing for a wider set of peace and security activities to be considered as ODA. This adjustment is not expected to have significant consequence on the ODA-eligibility of the APF.

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3. Activities and achievements in 2016

3.1. African-led PSOs

The PSOs are aimed at providing public security through a range of military and civilian tasks, including peacekeeping, maintenance of public order, policing, infrastructure reconstruction, political dialogue and national reconciliation. Several African-led initiatives have been deployed since 2004, often in a very hostile environment and a sensitive political context.

**AMISOM**

Following years of political instability and recurring conflicts, the UN Security Council authorised the African Union to deploy the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in February 2007 in order to promote long-term peace, security and effective governance.

Since then, AMISOM has contributed to:
- the establishment of new federal institutions in August/September 2012;
- the adoption of a new provisional constitution and provisions for presidential elections in the first quarter of 2017; and
- helping to combatting Al-Shabaab militants.

In 2016, AMISOM continued to play an important role in providing the security space needed to consolidate past gains and ensure the ongoing progress of the political process in Somalia.

The EU financial support to AMISOM, which accounts for more than 80% of the PSO contracted under the 2014-2016 APF action program, remains vital for the mission to fulfill its mandate.

Overall, AMISOM is financed by a broad set of donations, from the EU, the UN, and through financial and in-kind contributions provided bilaterally to the AU or directly to the AMISOM troop contributing countries, in particular the United States.

Since 2007, the EU has provided more than EUR 1.2 billion to the AU for AMISOM (including EUR 178 million in 2016) making the EU one of AMISOM’s biggest donors. EU funds are used to cover:
- allowances for AMISOM troops;
- salaries and allowances for the police component of the mission;
- international and local civilian staff salaries; and
- operational costs for the mission’s offices in Nairobi/Mogadishu and the AMISOM General Dhababdhan Training Camp in Mogadishu.

The APF’s financial support to AMISOM is an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive and long-term support for security and development efforts in Somalia. This approach contains political, diplomatic, civilian, military, humanitarian, and development dimensions. It includes three EU military missions, in the framework of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy:
- the EU Naval Force Operation ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR);
- the EU military training mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia); and
- the EU civilian maritime security capacity-building mission (EUCAP Nestor).

The regional indicative programme for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (EA-SA-IO) also supports capacity-building to tackle issues such as terrorism, and cross border and transnational organised crime.

However, political progress is still hampered by recurrent internal crisis, combined with a very volatile security environment. Al-Shabaab is adapting to the AMISOM offensive and continues to use asymmetric tactics to undermine the Federal Government of Somalia. Armed attacks against AMISOM, the Somali National Army and increasingly against civilian targets, take place frequently in Mogadishu and elsewhere. AMISOM’s presence and operational dynamism remains essential for the foreseeable future.
The revised AMISOM Concept of Operations (CONOPS) reflects efforts to enhance AMISOM and Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) operations, increase territorial recovery and consolidation by AMISOM and the SNAF until October 2018, and transfer security responsibilities to the SNAF from that date onwards. The CONOPS also requests troop contributing countries to ensure that the Force Commander has operational control of all AMISOM contingents.

ECOWAS Mission to Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB)
Established by Heads of States and Governments of the region in the aftermath of the military coup in Guinea Bissau on 12 April 2012, ECOMIB – now 543 military and police personnel – was deployed to:

- facilitate the withdrawal of the Angola Technical and Military Assistance Mission in Guinea Bissau (MISSANG);
- provide security to the transitional government and people of Guinea Bissau;
- assist in the effective implementation of the Defence and Security Sector Reform Program (DSSRP); and
- provide security for fresh elections and a return to democratic rule.

ECOMIB’s mandate has been renewed each year due to the persisting political crisis and instability in the country.

Following a previous commitment of EUR 5.2 million from July 2015, the EU provided EUR 10 million from July 2016 to June 2017 to help the government of Guinea Bissau consolidate its authority. The bulk of the APF contribution covers the allowances of troops on the ground. Despite the difficult political context, ECOMIB has been successful in providing a safe and secure environment.

The Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) represents a destabilising factor in the Central African sub-region which threatens security and human rights. In 2005, the LRA leaders were the first people to be indicted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity. In response to continuing attacks, the AUC established the RCI-LRA to defeat the LRA in the border region of Uganda, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan.

The RCI-LRA brings together those countries affected by LRA violence with the aim of providing a joint political, diplomatic and military response. It has proven successful in considerably wearing down the LRA, reducing the number of attacks, and encouraging combatants to defect. It comprises:

- a Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM), chaired by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and composed of the ministers of defence of the affected countries;
- a JCM secretariat headed by an AU Special Envoy; and
- a Regional Task Force (RTF) composed of troops from the affected countries.

The JCM coordinates the initiative at a strategic level. The RTF is tasked to search and engage the LRA bases and combatants. The RTF headquarters (HQ) in Yambio

36 Endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council in its meeting on 29 June 2016 in Addis Ababa.
3. ACTIVITIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN 2016

(South Sudan) coordinates information-sharing and operations between the three sector HQs in Nzara (South Sudan), Obo (CAR) and Dungu (DRC).

The APF’s support is provided in coordination with the United States. While the latter ensures logistical support and military advice to the troops, the EU focuses on the political and diplomatic tracks37 and direct support to military headquarters and to the secretariat.

The EU has extended its initial EUR 2 million support to the second phase of the RCI-LRA, which is aimed at consolidating and strengthening the current achievements and moving towards the full defeat of the LRA. The EU committed EUR 1 million from November 2015 to December 2016, to cover:

• the operational costs of the JCM Secretariat;
• the organisation of various international meetings and conferences; and
• staff allowances, communication equipment and operational costs for the RTF HQ in Yambio.

Following the international working group on the Lord’s Resistance Army that took place in Brussels on 30 November 2016, it was agreed to fund a third and final phase of the RCI-LRA mission, based on a revised CONOPS to be adopted in 2017.

Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission

Over the past eight years, the Boko Haram insurgency has been gradually spreading from north-east Nigeria to a large portion of the Lake Chad Basin. Its attacks against the population have severely affected the north-east of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger and threatened regional stability. More than 13,000 have been killed, 2.5 million people have been internally displaced, and an estimated 250,000 people have fled to neighbouring countries. In response, the countries concerned (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger) and Benin have reactivated the MNJTF under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and mandated by the AU PSC.

In August 2016, the EU signed an agreement with the AU for EUR 50 million until January 2018 to strengthen the regional coordination of the response and support the effective coordination and command of military operations through:

• the construction and maintenance of MNJTF headquarters in Ndjamen;
• sector Headquarters in Cameroon and Niger; and
• transport, communication and medical evacuation capabilities.

37 Support to the AU Special Envoy, coordination meetings, preparation and adoption of the strategic documents.

While the LCBC has the political authority over the MNJTF, the AUC ensures the oversight of the management of the operation. This set-up was necessary as the LCBC is not formally recognised as a REC under the APSA.

The MNJTF has been successful in considerably depleting Boko Haram’s strength and helping the population regain confidence. The MNJTF contributed to the liberation of hostages, the destruction of terrorist camps and the surrender of Boko Haram fighters.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) / Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) in South Sudan

The IGAD-MVM for South Sudan, headquartered in Juba, was set up on 23 January 2014, shortly after the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLMA-O). The MVM played a key role in providing a neutral and balanced analysis of the security situation...
to the IGAD mediation, through:
• documenting the violation of the ceasefire agreement;
• limiting the war propaganda–related communication; and
• analysing the measures needed by IGAD to increase leverage on the parties.

Between September 2014 and April 2016, the EU contributed EUR 5 million for the effective and sustained implementation of the MVM. A mid-term results-oriented monitoring exercise concluded in 2016 that the MVM had been successful in ensuring the commitment of the warring parties to engage in negotiations for the signing of a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

In January 2016, the MVM transitioned into the Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), which is part of the Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS) signed in July 2015. The extended mandate of CTSAMM includes:
• monitoring, investigating and verifying violations of the Permanent Ceasefire and the Transitional Security Arrangement (PCTSA) on a regular basis; and
• reporting and giving recommendations to the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), which monitors the implementation of the Transnational Security Arrangement (TSA).38

The APF support to CTSAMM amounts to EUR 9.2 million from May 2016 to April 2017 for the maintenance of:
• the Joint Technical Committee (JTC – CTSAMM) HQ based in Juba;
• the IGAD South Sudan Office in charge of the coordination of the financial support to CTSAMM based in Addis Ababa; and
• the planned sixteen Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs) spread throughout the territory of South Sudan.

Due to the severe deterioration of the security environment in 2016, CTSAMM only had a limited impact.

3.2. Capacity-building

Capacity-building has become a major component of the APF since its establishment, with the aim of increasing the capacity of the AU and the RECs/RMs in the area of peace and security. This should have a positive knock-on effect for the planning and conduct of PSOs, as well as the operationalisation of the APSA.

A number of support programmes have been rolled out to give the AU and the RECs/RMs the necessary instruments to address security challenges through effective and efficient institutions. The most important individual contribution to date is the APSA Support Programme.

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38 The TSA successfully implements the establishment of the Joint Integrated Police, Military, Presidential Guard and National Security Services.
3. ACTIVITIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN 2016

MAP 1: African-led Peace operations supported by the APF in 2016

AMISON
AU Mission in Somalia

ECOMIB
Guinea-Bissau

RCI-LRA
Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army

MNJTF
Lake Chad Basin region

CTSAMM
South Sudan
The APSA support programme

The APSA support programmes aim to strengthen the capacity and efficiency of the AUC and RECs/RMs to prevent or respond to crises and conflicts in Africa by operationalising the APSA. The first two phases of the APSA support programme (for EUR 44.2 million) came to an end in August and December 2015 respectively. The latter was mainly a bridging programme to support the drafting of the 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap by the AUC and RECs/RMs.

With the 2016-2020 APSA roadmap now adopted, the content and design of the current APSA support programme mirrors the strategic priorities identified in the roadmap:

- conflict prevention, crisis (early warning systems) and conflict management (African Standby Force) and mediation;
- post conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding;
- strategic security issues (terrorism, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), piracy, etc.); and
- coordination and partnerships.

The EUR 28.8 million committed from January 2016 to December 2018 covers the operationalisation of these priorities at the continental level (by the AU) and at the regional level (by ECOWAS, EAC, IGAD, EASF, ECCAS, NARC and COMESA).

Ensuring coherence and complementarity between continental and regional peace and security activities remains a challenge and should be clarified between the AU and the RECs. The Kagame report “the imperative to reinforce our union” is a welcomed development in this regard as it calls for a clearer subsidiarity between the AU and the RECs.

AUC salaries in peace and security

This programme, implemented as a joint financing agreement with other development partners, aims at sustaining the costs of AUC personnel working on the implementation of peace and security programmes. It therefore directly contributes to the operationalisation of the APSA on and ensures a closer link is maintained between continental and regional peace and security activities in Africa. Moreover, it provides an EU entry point for the dialogue with the AUC on its performance in the implementation of APSA.

The third phase of the programme, from July 2015 to August 2016, was based on a commitment of EUR 5 million. The fourth phase of the programme from September 2016 to December 2017 is expected to provide temporary support to the AUC while it formulates a new human resources policy and implements the AU Summit decisions on its financing. The EUR 5 million contract is yet to be finalised. Delays in the approval of a clear and detailed AUC restructuring plan continue to hinder the capacity and efficiency of the AU Peace and Security Department in managing peace and security programmes.

African Union Liaison Offices (AU LOs)

The programme, funded with other development partners (Sweden, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom) through a joint financing arrangement, aims at supporting the network of AU LOs in conflict and post conflict countries in Africa39. The most recent phase of this programme was for EUR 7 million from January 2016 to December 2017.

These offices are mandated by the AU Peace and Security Council to carry out political engagement, representation, monitoring, reporting and the facilitation of peace-build-

ing. The AU LOs are key elements in the African APSA, ensuring AU presence in these countries and contributing to the fulfilment of its mandate relating to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa.

In 2016 the AU LOs continued to play a crucial role in particular through consultations and dialogue with the relevant national parties and political actors in their host countries.

An external evaluation (financed under the APF) of the role of AU LOs from October 2016 to January 2017 found that they have made important contributions to peacebuilding and are valued by national governments and the international community. However, the evaluation identified a number of critical areas which need to be addressed. The biggest challenge is the fact that the LO network has become overstretched, with a number of them understaffed and lacking the ability to effectively intervene in complex conflict situations. The results of this evaluation will enable the EU to consider adjusting its financial support to the programme according to individual LOs.

The AMANI AFRICA II Support Programme

The African Standby Force (ASF) is one of the key components of the APSA. While the ASF reached full operational capability following a successful Amani Africa II field training exercise, it still lacks some operational capacities for rapid and efficient deployment. It consists of standby multidisciplinary contingents stationed in the five regions of origin (in North, Central, Southern, East, and West Africa) which are ready for rapid deployment for a wide range of actions.

In order to assess the progress made in the operationalisation of the ASF, the AU in cooperation with the EU, agreed to initiate a training/exercise cycle (from 2011-2016) named AMANI AFRICA II. Its overall objective was to check the capacity of the AU to mandate and use the rapid deployment capability of the ASF as a start-up operation and to run a multi-dimensional PSO.

From May 2012 to July 2016, the APF contributed EUR 5.2 million to cover the following costs of the cycle, which culminated in an exercise hosted by South Africa in late 2015:

- Training and planning activities;
- Deployment of AU HQs during the field training exercise;
- Post-exercise activities;
- Human resource and travel costs.

The results of the programme were the object of a Result Oriented Monitoring (ROM) report, which concluded that the programme did not reach its objectives. One of the report’s key recommendations is that there should be no further APF funding to support such a stand-alone programme for capacity-building. A third phase of the programme is not foreseen. Since the operationalisation of the ASF is a key component of the 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap’s priorities on conflict and crisis management, this objective has been integrated into the APSA Support Programme III.

Command, Control, Communication and Information System (C3IS)

The AU and EU agreed during the AMANI AFRICA II planning sessions on the need to create a technical working group to plan for the establishment of a C3IS for African-led PSOs.

The 2013 Mali crisis highlighted the capacity gap preventing Africa from playing a more effective role on the ground and asserting its leadership.

In 2013, the AU and the EU signed an agreement to acquire and set up the C3IS system for management of African-led PSOs with a EUR 12.5 million contribution from the APF from March 2013 to August 2017.
The overall objective is to put in place a continental structure enabling the AU to rapidly deploy strategic and operational communication, and command and control capabilities between the AU HQs in Addis Ababa, the regional level HQs and the mission HQs in the field. The C3IS will provide secure data, and voice and video services through satellite communication between the AU, the sub-regional organisations and the peace missions deployed at country level. It will also provide IT systems to convey orders, and generate reports and maps for the management of the operations on the ground.

The continuation of this programme will depend on the AUC strengthened and renewed commitment to implement the procurement process within agreed deadlines. The future of the programme will be one of the topics discussed during the AUC-EUC Steering Committees in 2017.

### 3.3. Early Response Mechanism (ERM)

The ERM was established in 2009 to strengthen the flexibility of the APF to address urgent crises across Africa. It has contributed to DEVCO’s specific objective 2 (“consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and the relevant principles of international law”) by providing the AU and RECs with an immediately available and reliable source of funding for the first steps of actions aimed at preventing, managing and resolving crises.

Following the conclusion of a positive first phase of the ERM in 2015, the AU and the EU signed a EUR 15 million agreement for a second phase, lasting from August 2015 to July 2018. ERM initiatives under this contract focus on the first stages on crisis emergence, though still allowing flexibility to ensure that the ERM is able to respond to crises in a swift and efficient manner, taking the challenging context into account.

ERM initiatives under the programme have had a strong focus on unforeseeable, urgent early stages of conflicts and crises which include but are not limited to:

- setting up mediation or political negotiations’ processes;
- shuttle diplomacy;
- supporting the deployment of security or human rights observers; or
- fact-finding missions for the preparation of Peace Support Operations.

In 2016, the ERM continued to fund five initiatives for EUR 5.9 million in the fields of mediation, shuttle diplomacy and human rights monitoring in Sudan/South Sudan, Libya and Burundi among others.

While ERM funding was essential to allow the AU to develop its mediation role, implementation efforts in 2016 showed that mediation activities take longer than the 12 months currently allowed under the ERM. The 2017-2018 APF Action Programme will include the possibility to fund longer term mediation support activities therefore.
3. ACTIVITIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN 2016

MAP 2: Initiatives supported under the ERM in 2016

- HR and military experts in Burundi: Phase II
- Support to Mediation AU High Representative: South Sudan
- Uganda-led mediation/ Burundi Dialogue
- AU High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) V: Sudan/South Sudan
- Support to African Union High Representative (AUHR): Libya
In 2016, the ERM funded 5 actions for a total amount of EUR 5.9 million that were instrumental in either preventing or mitigating conflict in several African regions.

The support of ERM to the AUC Human Rights and Military experts in Burundi has enabled AUC contacts with several governmental and non-governmental stakeholders and international partners. This interaction allowed first-hand contrasted information on the evolution of the situation, notably on the human rights and disarmament. The Human Rights Observers (HRO) have worked hand in hand with the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights and has managed to document multiple cases of the violation of human rights. Since the situation remained fragile, the APF continued its support through a PSO from 1 November 2016.

The EAC/Ugandan-led mediation in Burundi, led by former Ugandan President Museveni, supported inter-Burundian dialogue which achieved common understanding on a number of issues, including the question of a third term, the electoral calendar, the government of national unity, the status of the Arusha Accord, and the return of refugees. Museveni reached an agreement with the different parties on a roadmap with three main phases of assessment, dialogue strategy and dialogue implementation. Together with extensive consultations with Burundian officials, a team of international envoys for the Great Lakes Region, the UN and AUC officials, this led to three attempts for inter-Burundian dialogue.

The ERM support to the AU High Representative for South Sudan enabled the former President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konare to continue assisting the South Sudan parties in pursuing a peaceful process, particularly through the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ACRSS). More specifically the ERM support has enabled consultations and commitments between different key stakeholders, both at the national and international level.

The African Union High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) led by the Chairperson and former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, has succeeded in convening strategic consultations from 18 to 21 March 2016 in Addis. These consultations were attended by the representatives of the Government of Sudan and the leaders of opposition parties. The AUHIP combined submissions by both parties into a single Roadmap Agreement which was signed by the Government and later by some opposition leaders. Additionally AUHIP is facilitating the involvement of key stakeholders in the national dialogue in order to ensure an inclusive process.

The ERM has also supported the AU High Representative in Libya, former President of Tanzania Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, to undertake a series of consultations with the Libyan authorities and other relevant stakeholders including CSOs, political parties and armed groups, in order to foster constructive political dialogue aimed at national reconciliation. Mr Kikwete has also participated in the Constitution Drafting Assembly and has established contacts with the Government of National Accord of Libya.
4. Management of the APF

4.1 APF Management

The European Commission uses both direct and indirect management to implement the APF. Indirect management was used for operations implemented by the AUC, which was the case for more than 90% of programmes in 2016. Direct management, in the form of grants, is used for programmes implemented by RECs and RMs. In 2016, this was the case for ECOMIB (implemented by ECOWAS), and MVM and CTSAMM (implemented by IGAD).

The evolution of the APF evolution, and the higher number of crises and activities in all three areas of PSOs, capacity-building (APSA) and prevention/mediation (ERM)) have represented a challenge for the EU institutions and even more so for the institutional beneficiaries of the APF, in terms of operational and financial management, and increasingly demanding transparency, accountability and reporting requirements.

One of the major challenges faced by the APSA institutions is to strengthen their capacity to a level equal to their political ambitions. Financial ex-post audits are systematically conducted for all APF interventions, including AU-led PSOs. Several of these audits have identified weaknesses related to the financial management and internal control of the African partner implementing organisation, which has led the European Commission to considerably increase its focus on this area. The European Commission and the AUC signed an Aide Memoire in April 2016 to strengthen the AUC’s financial management capacities. Such measures also apply to the RECs/RMs whose audits revealed critical financial findings.

Monitoring

Two coordination mechanisms have been foreseen to improve governance and oversight of the APF.

At the political level, a Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) has been established. The JCC is jointly chaired by the AUC and the EU and comprises representatives of the RECs/RMs. It monitors the implementation of the APF through regular meetings and exchanges on implementation and operational issues between the relevant departments of the AUC and Commission services, the EEAS and the EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa. The JCC should meet on a yearly basis to discuss the status of the EU-Africa partnership in the area of peace and security. The next JCC meeting will be integrated within a wider Senior Officials Meetings (SOM), in April/May 2017. The SOM will serve as platform to discuss the EU, AU and UN contributions to peace and security in Africa and as a preparatory meeting for the fifth Africa-EU summit to be held in November in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.

The second mechanism is the Steering Committee which meets on a quarterly basis at the technical level in order to oversee the management of the overall AU-EU development cooperation and to track progress. The first Steering Committee meeting was held on 29 June 2016, and the second on 15 November 2016, both in Addis Ababa.

APF communication and visibility

In 2016, efforts have been made to continue and reinforce communication and visibility on APF activities. Press releases and press briefings are prepared for international conferences and for each funding decision by the European Commission. The website dedicated to the Africa-EU Partnership includes additional information on the APF. Furthermore, the annual APF report is widely circulated. An overarching communication plan on the APF as an instrument will complement specific communication activities.
4.2. Exchange of staff and technical assistance to reinforce the management of the APF

A trilateral Administrative Arrangement between the European Commission/EEAS and the AUC was signed in April 2016 to foster better administrative cooperation between the institutions in sector of common interest, such as on staff professional development, policy-making process and financial management. Under the Arrangement, the EEAS and European Commission staff will be able to work, for a limited period of time, in the administration of the African Union Commission and vice-versa and exchange expertise.

In 2016, 7 AUC staff from the “Programming, Budgeting, Finance and Accounting Department (PBFA)” and the “Procurement, Travel and Store Division” benefited from this exchange programme. Exchange of best practices and modalities notably on the budget preparation process, procurement, and staff travel policy have taken place through meetings with EU officials and ad-hoc trainings.

Moreover, the European Commission will provide results-oriented technical assistance to the AUC, to address financial management issues. Early in 2017, five short-term assignments in the areas of audit, procurement and internal audit were selected.
Figure 1 – APF contracted amounts per type of activity, 2004-2016 (in million EUR)\(^41\)

Table 1: APF financial overview under the 9\(^{th}\) + 10\(^{th}\) + 11\(^{th}\) EDF (in million EUR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Global Commitments</th>
<th>Individual Commitments (contracted) (PSO, CB, ERM)</th>
<th>Individual Commitments (paid) (PSO, CB, ERM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>9(^{th}) EDF</strong></td>
<td>EUR 347.7 m</td>
<td>EUR 347.2 m</td>
<td>EUR 347.2 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10(^{th}) EDF</strong></td>
<td>EUR 751.3 m</td>
<td>EUR 746.9 m</td>
<td>EUR 723.6 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11(^{th}) EDF</strong></td>
<td>EUR 1,051.2 m</td>
<td>EUR 879.1 m</td>
<td>EUR 742.4 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>EUR 2,150 m</td>
<td>EUR 1,973 m</td>
<td>EUR 1,813 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 1: APF financial overview under the 9\(^{th}\), 10\(^{th}\) and 11\(^{th}\) EDF: individual commitments (contracted, in million EUR)

41 €12.9 million for Audit Evaluation Technical Assistance are not included in this figure.
Graph 2: APF financial overview under the 9th, 10th and 11th EDF: individual commitments for PSOs (contracted, in million EUR)

Graph 3: APSA support programme 2010-2016 (in million EUR) – commitments AUC/RECs/RMs

NB: contingencies amounts are not taken into account.
Table 2. Initiatives supported under the ERM in 2016:

1. Human rights and military experts’ deployment in Burundi – phase II
   (01/09/2015 – 31/05/2016, EUR 2.2 million)

Given the deteriorating security situation in Burundi, the African Union strengthened its programme to deploy human rights observers and military experts to the country. They monitor, investigate, and report on the human rights situation, verify the process of disarming the militias and other armed groups in Burundi, and undertake local peace-building activities. It also supports the logistical needs of additional human rights observers and military experts deployed to Burundi. It facilitates related AU efforts, including dialogue among stakeholders and contributes to defusing the current tension. Finally, it enables the AU make appropriate decisions through regular reports on the implementation of the disarmament process.

2. Support to the AU High Representative for South Sudan and to the AU High-Level ad hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government on South Sudan
   (01/09/2015 – 31/05/2016, EUR 0.8 million)

IGAD-led mediation efforts were enhanced in order to help the South Sudanese parties and other stakeholders to achieve durable peace in the country.

3. Support to the inter-Burundian dialogue under the leadership of Uganda
   (20/12/2015 – 30/03/2016, EUR 0.3 million)

On behalf of the EAC, Uganda is facilitating the rapid commencement of the inter-Burundian dialogue, to address the issues and create the conditions necessary for a consensus on the way ahead, based on the Arusha Agreement, which is the cornerstone of peace, security, stability and reconciliation in Burundi.

4. Support to the African Union High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) for Sudan/South Sudan
   (01/03/2016-31/12/16, EUR 0.25 million)

On behalf of the AU High Implementation Panel and in the capacity of Chairperson, the former South African President Thabo Mbeki has convened strategic consultations between the Government of Sudan and leaders of the opposition parties to engage in a national dialogue.

5. Support to the African Union High Representative (AUHR) in Libya
   (16/06/2016 – 16/03/2017, EUR 0.3 million)

On behalf of the AU, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, former president of Tanzania, is undertaking a series of consultations with Libyan authorities and other relevant stakeholders, including CSOs, political parties and armed groups to foster a constructive political dialogue aimed at national reconciliation.
Table 3: Initiatives supported by the ERM missions since its creation in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Implementing partner</th>
<th>Authorized (in thousands of EUR)</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>422</td>
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<td>14/08/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUHIP I</td>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>15/02/2010</td>
<td>31/10/2010</td>
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<td>Guinea Conakry</td>
<td>AUC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>01/04/2010</td>
<td>31/12/2010</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>09/04/2010</td>
<td>30/09/2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>337</td>
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<td>LRA I</td>
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<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>04/02/2011</td>
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<td>05/02/2011</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>265</td>
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<td>20/12/2011</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
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<td>01/08/2012</td>
<td>31/03/2013</td>
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<td>Sahel/AU SAPROG</td>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>01/01/2013</td>
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<td>AUHIP III</td>
<td>AUC</td>
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<td>01/03/2013</td>
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<td>JVM / ICGLR</td>
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<td>997</td>
<td>15/06/2013</td>
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<td>AU-ECOWAS (Mali HR observers)</td>
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<td>01/07/2013</td>
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<td>LRA III</td>
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<td>AFISM-CAR</td>
<td>AUC</td>
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<td>19/09/2013</td>
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<td>IGAD mediation South Sudan</td>
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<td>IGAD mediation South-Sudan 2</td>
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<td>Burundi mediation</td>
<td>AUC</td>
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<td>20/12/2015</td>
<td>30/03/2016</td>
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<td>AUHIP V</td>
<td>AUC</td>
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<td>01/03/2016</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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6. Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFISM-CAR/MISCA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission in the CAR</td>
</tr>
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